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11 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Military Economic Analysis Center, OSR

[REDACTED]
Soviet Strategic Forces Division, OSR

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on "Priority of Soviet Open-Ocean
ASW: A Quantitative Analysis," April 1978
(SR 78-10077)

1. I have just read your April research paper on the priority of Soviet open-ocean ASW. I am afraid that I find it confusing and perhaps misleading. I believe the problem I have is ambiguity and overlap in your definitions of Soviet missions.

2. In the first paragraph on page 3, you appear to divide the nine missions that you have selected for the Soviet navy into two categories:

a. Traditional--coastal defense, amphibious, mine and SLOC interdiction.

b. Open-ocean--strategic attack, reconnaissance, anti-ship, ASW (in distant areas).

I don't quite see the difference between anti-ship and SLOC interdiction. I don't know why reconnaissance is listed under open-ocean unless you have selected out those reconnaissance elements that have only a coastal waters capability. I don't know how you differentiate between anti-submarine warfare ships that have both coastal and open-ocean capabilities.

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3. I frankly don't look on fleet air defense reconnaissance, mine warfare, ASW, anti-ship, or coastal defense as missions for any navy. My concept of the missions of the navy is as follows:

- a. Strategic deterrence.
- b. Sea control.
 - (1) Denial operations.
 - (a) Coastal.
 - (b) Open-ocean.
 - (2) Assertion operations.
- c. Projection of power ashore.
- d. Naval presence.

These are output functions, which is what I believe missions are. ASW is a tactical capability that contributes to achieving some end product or mission.

4. It seems to me what you're trying to discern is whether the Soviets are placing more emphasis on capabilities for denying us the use of the seas in open-oceans as contrasted with their long preoccupation with denying us entry into coastal waters like the Norwegian Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, etc. Possibly you are also looking at whether they are seeking to strike out and be able to assert their own use of the seas in wartime in areas outside those coastal waters.

- a. If they are going to exercise open-ocean sea denial, they will need an anti-ship capability that can survive in the relatively more hostile environment of the open-ocean, including the high probability of US control of the air, either from land bases or aircraft carriers. Thus, some anti-ship capabilities are applicable, others are not. If they are going to use surface ships in this sea denial open-ocean role, they are going to have to have fleet air defense capabilities. If you are hypothesizing that, then those two categories should be combined instead of split as you have them. Similarly, with reconnaissance they will need reconnaissance to do open-ocean sea denial, but I don't know whether the reconnaissance you have listed here as being strictly coastal or traditional has a long-range and survivable capability also.

b. Mine warfare cuts both ways also. If you think they are going to find ways by submarines or possibly aircraft to drop mines astride our sea lanes or in the entrances to our ports, that has to come under sea denial open-ocean. If they are going to mine their own areas, particularly against our submarine intrusions, then it is under traditional and coastal.

c. Amphibious warfare comes under the projection of power.

d. Strategic attack comes under strategic deterrence.


e. Coastal defense comes under sea denial coastal.

5. Overall, I hope that when you use the Delphi technique and have your respondents divide things up into the nine categories you gave them, you gave them some precise definitions of those categories. Otherwise, I believe you will have invalid results because people will interpret these nine categories quite differently.

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